Russia and Azerbaijan aren’t getting along very well right now, and some people think it’s not just about the recent events we hear in the news -- They Are Right

From Friends to Friction

After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, Azerbaijan became independent. For a while, it kept good relations with Russia, especially under President Heydar Aliyev in the 1990s. But over time, cracks began to show. In 2009, Azerbaijan learned that Russia had secretly given many weapons to Armenia (Azerbaijan’s rival) en.wikipedia.org. Azerbaijani officials were upset and even summoned the Russian ambassador to complain. Russia denied the arms transfers, but later leaks suggested it really happened en.wikipedia.org. This was an early sign of mistrust.

Throughout the 2010s, Azerbaijan started to pull away from Russia’s shadow:

In 2012, Azerbaijan decided not to renew Russia’s lease on a major radar base in Gabala. Russia had to leave that station en.wikipedia.org. This reduced Russia’s military footprint in Azerbaijan.
Russia reacted by stopping the use of a pipeline that carried some Azerbaijani oil through Russia en.wikipedia.org. There were also small disputes, like Russian authorities holding an Azerbaijani oil tanker on suspicion of smuggling en.wikipedia.org.
Azerbaijan also stayed out of Russia’s close alliances. It did not join Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union or the CSTO military alliance, showing it wanted an independent path.

By the late 2010s, the friendship had cooled. Russia was focused elsewhere (like conflicts in Ukraine and Syria), and Azerbaijan was looking to new partners. The sections below explain the key reasons for the rising tensions between the two countries.

Russia’s Influence Fades in the South Caucasus

Russia used to be the big power in the South Caucasus (the region including Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia). But its influence over Azerbaijan has been shrinking in recent years. There are a few reasons for this decline:

Busy with Other Conflicts: Russia has been distracted by other wars. For example, after Russia sent troops into Ukraine in 2022, it had fewer resources and less attention for the Caucasus washingtonpost.com. A Russian analyst noted that because of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin “does not have enough resources to fight on several fronts” washingtonpost.com. This gave Azerbaijan more room to act on its own.
Azerbaijan’s Independent Stance: Azerbaijan has grown bolder in challenging Moscow’s dominance washingtonpost.com. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan has been in power since 2003. He learned to balance relations with Russia, but he also made sure Azerbaijan could make its own decisions. For instance, Azerbaijan did not always side with Russia on big issues. It even strengthened ties with countries that Russia sees as rivals (like Turkey, as we’ll see next).
Waning Russian Prestige: Many people in Azerbaijan feel less dependent on Russia now. There is a large Azerbaijani diaspora (maybe up to 2 million ethnic Azerbaijanis) living in Russia apnews.com. They used to be a bridge between the countries. But recent events (like violent incidents against Azerbaijanis in Russia) have hurt that goodwill. An example is when Russian police in 2025 raided Azerbaijani homes in the city of Yekaterinburg. Two ethnic Azeri men died in custody, allegedly after being tortured apnews.comapnews.com. Baku called these “targeted and extrajudicial killings” of Azerbaijanis in Russia apnews.com. Such events make Azerbaijan’s people and government angry at Russia, weakening Russia’s image and influence.

All of these factors show how Moscow’s grip on its old backyard is not as strong as it used to be. Russia once acted like a big brother in the region, but now Azerbaijan feels more free to ignore Moscow’s wishes. This loss of control is a major reason for the tensions.

Azerbaijan’s New Friends and Alliances

As Russia’s influence waned, Azerbaijan sought new friends and alliances to support its independence. Two important partners have been Turkey and Israel, among others. By building these relationships, Azerbaijan has reduced its reliance on Russia.

Closer to Turkey: Azerbaijan has deep cultural and linguistic ties with Turkey. A popular phrase in both countries is “one nation, two states.” Over the past decade, Azerbaijan and Turkey became even closer allies. We will discuss Turkey’s role in detail in the next section, but in short, Turkey provides political support and modern weapons to Azerbaijan. This close friendship makes Azerbaijan feel secure without Russia.
Friendship with Israel: Azerbaijan has also strengthened its ties with Israel washingtonpost.com. This might be surprising to some, since Azerbaijan is a Muslim-majority country. But Azerbaijan and Israel have found common interests. Azerbaijan sells a lot of oil to Israel and in return buys advanced Israeli military equipment washingtonpost.com. For example, Israeli drones and other high-tech weapons have been sold to Azerbaijan. This arms partnership grew especially as Russia’s own relations with Israel got worse (due to Russia’s closeness with Iran) washingtonpost.com. By being friends with Israel, Azerbaijan gains a powerful ally and source of weapons outside of Russia’s orbit.
Warming up to the West and Neighbors: Azerbaijan has also inched closer to Western countries and other neighbors. It provides oil and gas to Europe (as we’ll see in the economic section), which makes Europe pay more attention to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is officially neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, but it has shown support for Ukraine at times. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s president even welcomed Ukraine’s foreign minister in Baku, a move that signaled closer ties with Kyiv apnews.com. This happened shortly after Aliyev declined Putin’s invitation to a Victory Day parade in Moscow, which was a noticeable snub to Russia apnews.com. Such gestures suggest Azerbaijan is not afraid to appear friendly with Russia’s rivals.

These shifting alliances have alarmed Moscow. In the past, Azerbaijan was more firmly in Russia’s camp, but now it is clearly hedging its bets. As one observer put it, Azerbaijan is “seeking closer alliances with Turkey and Israel” and pushing back against “Russian dominance in the Caucasus” washingtonpost.comwashingtonpost.com. This realignment away from Russia is a key underlying cause of tension.

Azerbaijani and Turkish soldiers participate in a joint military exercise. Turkey and Azerbaijan often hold drills together, reflecting their deepening military ties.

Turkey’s Growing Role in Azerbaijan

Turkey’s role has been central in Azerbaijan’s shift. Turkey is like an older brother to Azerbaijan – they share culture, language, and religion. Over the last decade, Turkey has become Azerbaijan’s closest ally and this makes Russia uneasy.

Military Support: Turkey has provided major military help to Azerbaijan. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey supplied advanced drones and other weapons that were crucial for Azerbaijan’s victory washingtonpost.com. Turkish-made Bayraktar drones helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenian forces, tipping the balance on the battlefield. After the war, Turkey and Azerbaijan formalized their alliance. In June 2021, they signed the Shusha Declaration, which says the two countries will help each other in security matters and modernize their armies together. Essentially, it made them official allies.
Joint Exercises: Azerbaijan and Turkey now regularly hold joint military exercises. In late 2023, right after Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh, they launched new drills involving thousands of troops reuters.comreuters.com. Exercises have been held in Baku, in Nakhchivan (a part of Azerbaijan that borders Turkey), and even in reclaimed territories of Karabakh reuters.com. These exercises show how closely the two armies cooperate. Turkey’s defense ministry and officers often work with their Azerbaijani counterparts, improving Azerbaijan’s capabilities to NATO standards. This deep military partnership worries Russia, because it means a NATO-member influence (Turkey) right in what Russia considers its backyard.
Political Backing: Turkey has consistently backed Azerbaijan in political disputes. Turkey openly supports Azerbaijan’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh and has no relations with Armenia (due in part to historic issues). Knowing Turkey is behind it, Azerbaijan feels more confident standing up to pressure. One expert noted that Aliyev might not have dared to act so boldly without “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan behind his back” washingtonpost.com. Turkey gives Aliyev the assurance that he won’t stand alone against Russia or anyone else.
Economic and Cultural Links: Turkey and Azerbaijan also trade and invest in each other. They built important projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the TANAP gas pipeline (which goes through Turkey). Culturally, Turkish schools and TV are popular in Azerbaijan, strengthening people-to-people bonds. All this creates a sense of brotherhood.

For Russia, Turkey’s deepening role in the Caucasus is a strategic challenge. Russian officials are likely unsettled by Turkey’s expanding influence in the region. Turkey is effectively replacing some of the security role that Russia used to play middleeasteye.net. This shift is a less-publicized but major reason for tensions: Moscow doesn’t like seeing Ankara become the big friend and protector of Baku.

Oil, Gas, and Pipelines: The Power of Energy

Azerbaijan is rich in oil and natural gas, and this has big effects on its relations with Russia. Control over energy routes = power, and Azerbaijan has worked hard to control its own oil and gas exports. This often put it at odds with Russia, which traditionally dominated energy in the region.

Bypassing Russia’s Pipelines: In the Soviet times, any oil or gas from Azerbaijan had to go through Russia to reach world markets. But after independence, Azerbaijan, with help from Western companies, built new pipelines that do not cross Russia. A key project was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, opened in 2006, which carries Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. This meant Azerbaijan could sell oil globally (for example to Europe or the U.S.) without Russian pipelines. Russia was not happy about losing that control ijcv.org. Similarly, for natural gas, Azerbaijan built the South Caucasus Pipeline from Baku to Turkey (through Georgia) planete-energies.complanete-energies.com. This became part of the “Southern Gas Corridor,” a series of pipelines that now deliver Azerbaijani gas all the way to Italy in Europe planete-energies.com. In late 2020, the final piece (the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to Italy) was completed, and by the end of 2021 Azerbaijan began sending gas directly to Europe planete-energies.com. These projects greatly reduced Russia’s leverage over Azerbaijan’s energy sector.
Competing to Supply Europe: Europe wants to buy energy from reliable sources. After Russia’s war in Ukraine, European countries tried to cut down on buying Russian gas. They turned more to Azerbaijan for gas supplies. In fact, Azerbaijan’s exports of gas to Europe jumped by around 30% after the war started planete-energies.com. The EU even made new deals with Baku to increase gas imports. For Russia, this is like losing a customer and seeing a rival (Azerbaijan) benefit. European officials have even suggested using some existing pipelines in Ukraine to send Azerbaijani gas (once used for Russian gas) politico.euintellinews.com. All of this is a big shift. It weakens Russia’s energy grip and strengthens Azerbaijan’s role as an energy provider.
Who Sells Gas to Whom: Interestingly, at times Russia and Azerbaijan both cooperate and compete in energy. Azerbaijan bought some gas from Russia for its own needs in the past apnews.com, and when Azerbaijan had extra gas, Russia’s Gazprom sometimes bought it (partly to keep it off the European market). But in 2015, Azerbaijan stopped selling gas to Russia as it prepared to send more to Europe itself eurasian-research.org. More recently, in late 2022, there were reports that Azerbaijan resumed some gas imports from Russia to meet domestic demand econstor.eu (possibly to free up more of its own gas for export). These arrangements can be technical, but the big picture is: Azerbaijan is no longer an energy pawn of Russia. It can route its oil and gas independently and even help Europe replace Russian fuel.
Economic Diversification: Beyond oil and gas, Azerbaijan’s economy is linked to Russia in other ways. For example, Russia has been a main market for Azerbaijan’s fruits and vegetables apnews.com. And Russia is a transit route for Azerbaijan’s trade with Iran and the Middle East apnews.com. Many Azerbaijanis work or do business in Russia, sending money home. These ties mean that when relations sour, there is economic pain. Recently, as ties worsened, Russia temporarily banned some Azerbaijani food imports (citing health reasons, though many saw it as political). Likewise, Azerbaijan has looked to sell more to other countries to reduce any economic pressure from Moscow.

In summary, control of pipelines and energy exports is a less-obvious driver of tension. Azerbaijan’s success in building independent pipelines took away a key tool Russia used to have over Baku. Now Azerbaijan’s oil and gas give it wealth and strategic importance that Russia cannot easily undermine. This fuels Baku’s confidence – and Moscow’s annoyance.

Guns and Guards: Military Deals and Defense Networks

Military ties and arms deals play a major role in the Russia-Azerbaijan dynamic. For years, Russia was the top arms supplier to both Azerbaijan and Armenia, effectively arming both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But as Azerbaijan shifted alliances, its military shopping list and partnerships changed, leading to more friction with Moscow.

Buying Weapons from Russia (Before): Not long ago, Azerbaijan actually bought a lot of weapons from Russia. President Aliyev once said that by 2018 Azerbaijan had spent around $5 billion on military equipment from Russia sipri.org. In the period 2013–2017, Russia supplied about 65% of Azerbaijan’s imported weapons jamestown.org. These included tanks, artillery, helicopters, and even an S-300 air defense system. Why did Baku buy from Moscow? Partly to keep Russia satisfied (so Russia would be less inclined to arm Armenia even more), and partly because those weapons were available quickly. However, this also meant Azerbaijan relied on Russia for spare parts and training.
Turning to New Suppliers (Now): In recent years, especially after 2020, Azerbaijan has turned more to Turkey, Israel, and others for its military needs. Turkey provides training and some equipment (like armored vehicles and missiles). Israel has sold Azerbaijan high-tech drones (such as “loitering” munitions) and air defense systems. These weapons proved very effective in combat. As a result, Azerbaijan is less dependent on Russian arms than before. Moscow notices this. Every drone Azerbaijan buys from Turkey or Israel is one less helicopter it might buy from Russia. This means less influence and less revenue for Russia.
Regional Defense Clubs: Azerbaijan has also engaged in regional defense cooperation that sidelines Russia. For instance, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan have held joint drills (sometimes called the “Three Brothers” exercises) to improve coordination. Azerbaijan is part of GUAM (a group with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) which was created as a kind of counterbalance to Russian-led groups. While GUAM is mostly economic, it does have a political/security flavor that Russia dislikes. Unlike Armenia, which hosts a Russian military base and is in Russia’s CSTO alliance, Azerbaijan has no foreign bases on its soil and prefers ad-hoc coalitions. From Russia’s perspective, Azerbaijan is building a security network that excludes Russia – another sore point.
The Peacekeeper Puzzle: After the 2020 war, Russia stationed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops in part of Nagorno-Karabakh to keep the ceasefire apnews.com. These troops are armed Russians on Azerbaijani-recognized land. Initially, their presence gave Moscow some leverage (they could be seen as guardians of the remaining Armenians in Karabakh). But Azerbaijan views the peacekeepers with suspicion and wants them to leave when their mandate expires (by 2025). Tensions have flared around the peacekeepers. In 2023, when Azerbaijan took back the rest of Karabakh, some Russian peacekeepers were accidentally killed in the fighting politico.eunewsweek.com. Aliyev apologized, but it was a shocking incident – Russian soldiers dying at Azerbaijani hands was unheard of before. It underscored the new reality that Azerbaijan’s army is now strong and assertive, even to the point of deadly mishaps with Russian forces. Incidents like that put immense strain on trust.

In summary, Azerbaijan’s military power no longer comes mainly from Russian help. It comes from other partners and its own improved army. Meanwhile, Russia’s direct role – whether through arms sales or boots on the ground – is shrinking. This military decoupling contributes to the quiet rivalry and tension underneath the polite diplomatic surface.

Shadowy Struggles: Spies, Cyber, and Proxy Conflicts

Not all conflicts are fought openly. Some are fought in the shadows – through espionage, cyber attacks, propaganda, or using other countries as proxies. Between Russia and Azerbaijan, these hidden struggles have been intensifying, even if they don’t always make big headlines.

Crackdown on Russian Influence Operations: Azerbaijan has become increasingly wary of Russian spies or influence agents operating in the country. In early 2025, Azerbaijan closed a Russian cultural center in Baku (called the “Russian House”) and cut down the staff of the Russian state media outlet Sputnik in Azerbaijan therecord.mediatherecord.media. The official reasons were things like “lack of proper registration” or “illegal financing,” but Azerbaijani media reported that the Russian cultural center was involved in espionage (spying) for Moscow therecord.media. Baku essentially accused these organizations of acting as cover for Russian intelligence. Russia, of course, denied this and called it disinformation therecord.media. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan took the dramatic step of shutting them down, showing how mistrustful it has become of Russian intentions.
Cyber Attacks and Information War: Shortly after those closures, in February 2025, Azerbaijani media outlets were hit by a cyberattack. Azerbaijani officials blamed APT29 (Cozy Bear) – a hacker group linked to Russia’s intelligence service therecord.media. They believed it was retaliation for Baku’s moves against Russian institutions therecord.media. The cyberattack tried to spread false news and disrupt Azerbaijani news sites therecord.media. It even targeted a TV channel that had accused the Russian cultural center of spying therecord.media. This kind of cyber warfare is a shadow conflict: no bombs or troops, but a battle for information and morale. It shows Russia may be using its hackers to pressure Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan is openly calling them out.
Proxy and Regional Power Games: The Russia-Azerbaijan tension also plays out through other countries. For instance, Armenia (Azerbaijan’s neighbor and rival) is a traditional Russian ally. When Azerbaijan fights Armenia (as in 2020), some see it as also a blow to Russia’s prestige, since Russia is supposed to protect Armenia. Conversely, if Russia wanted to pressure Azerbaijan, it could boost military support to Armenia or encourage Armenia to be less compromising – effectively using Armenia as a proxy in the rivalry. Something similar might be happening with Iran: Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran have been strained (Iran mistrusts Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel and Turkey). Russia, which is friendly with Iran, has sometimes coordinated with Iran in the region. There have been unconfirmed rumors that Russia and Iran share intelligence to undermine Azerbaijan’s plans (for example, spreading disinformation that Ukraine and Azerbaijan might start trouble in Karabakh therecord.media). While hard to prove, these proxy dynamics mean Azerbaijan and Russia often find themselves on opposite sides of regional issues, even if not directly shooting at each other.
Arrests and Tit-for-Tat Moves: In mid-2025, things got even more tense on the intelligence front. After the incident in Yekaterinburg where Azerbaijanis were killed, Azerbaijan’s police stormed the Baku offices of Sputnik (the Russian media outlet) and arrested several staff apnews.com. They also detained other Russian citizens in Baku (IT specialists and others), accusing them of crimes like cybercrime and even drug smuggling apnews.com. Photos showed the detainees with bruised faces, which caused outrage in Russia apnews.com. Russian hawks accused Azerbaijan of taking Russians as “hostages” and demanded a tough response apnews.com. Russia then detained a leader of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia as apparent retaliation apnews.com. This back-and-forth of arrests and harassment is basically a spy-vs-spy game coming out into the open. Each side suggests the other’s citizens might be involved in wrongdoing or espionage.

All these covert or semi-covert clashes add a layer of bitterness to Russia-Azerbaijan relations. They indicate that beyond the smiles in official meetings, there is a lot of distrust and dark maneuvering. Each country suspects the other of plotting behind the scenes. This makes their relationship fragile, even if they avoid direct military conflict with each other.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and Russia’s Peacekeepers

One of the biggest turning points in recent history for the region was the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This war between Azerbaijan and Armenia (over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh) lasted 44 days and ended with Azerbaijan regaining much of the territory it had lost in the 1990s. The outcome of this war significantly affected Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia.

Russia’s Careful Stance: Nagorno-Karabakh is tricky for Russia. Russia is formally allied with Armenia (through the CSTO) and has a military base in Armenia. But Russia also had good ties with Azerbaijan and was selling arms to both sides. In the 2020 war, Russia stayed neutral and did not intervene militarily to help Armenia, even when Armenia was losing en.wikipedia.org. Analysts say this was partly because Russia’s relations with Armenia’s new government weren’t great (Armenia had a revolution in 2018 and its leader was less pro-Russian) en.wikipedia.org. Also, Russia did not want to spoil its growing ties with Azerbaijan. So Putin’s government balanced between the two. It facilitated some ceasefire talks en.wikipedia.org but ultimately let Azerbaijan make gains. This neutrality shocked Armenians and showed Baku that Russia would not always stop Azerbaijan’s advances.
Azerbaijan’s Victory and Confidence: With crucial help from Turkey’s weaponry apnews.com, Azerbaijan won a decisive victory in 2020, reclaiming large areas around Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenian forces had held for nearly 30 years. Russia then brokered a truce in November 2020 and deployed about 2,000 peacekeepers to the remaining Armenian-populated part of Karabakh apnews.com. For Azerbaijan, this victory was huge. It boosted national pride and President Aliyev’s popularity. It also made Azerbaijan much more assertive in the region apnews.com. As the AP News noted, the 2020 win “fueled Azerbaijan’s ambitions” and prompted Aliyev to take a stronger stand with neighbors apnews.com – including Russia. Azerbaijan felt it no longer had to be so cautious or deferential, because it had achieved a long-sought goal largely on its own terms.
Russian Peacekeepers: Guardians or Pawns? The Russian peacekeepers were deployed for a five-year term (until 2025) to protect the ethnic Armenian population in what remained of their Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and to keep the Lachin Corridor (road linking Karabakh to Armenia) open. Initially, this gave Russia a role as a power broker – neither Baku nor Yerevan wanted to anger the peacekeepers. However, over time, tensions arose. Azerbaijan accused the Armenian side of using the Russian-protected zone to smuggle in weapons, and accused some Russian peacekeepers of turning a blind eye. In late 2022 and into 2023, Azerbaijani activists (and later officials) effectively blocked the Lachin Corridor, causing a crisis for Armenians in Karabakh. Russian peacekeepers were criticized for not preventing this. Armenia grew angry at Russia for not doing more, even calling it a failure of duty. Azerbaijan, for its part, grew impatient that Russian troops were still on its territory at all. By September 2023, Azerbaijan decided to remove the last vestiges of the Karabakh separatist administration in a one-day lightning offensive apnews.com. This time, Russia did nothing to stop Azerbaijan, which deeply upset Armenia’s government apnews.com but again showed that Moscow was not going to fight Baku. After this operation, Nagorno-Karabakh came under Azerbaijani control fully, and the ethnic Armenian population fled en masse. Russia’s role was diminished to humanitarian help and negotiating the surrender.
Post-2020 Dynamics: The outcomes of 2020 and 2023 made Azerbaijan more powerful relative to Armenia than ever before. It also made Armenia question Russia’s value as an ally, leading Yerevan to start looking more to the West for security. So in an ironic twist, Russia’s closest regional ally (Armenia) drifted away, and its once-neutral partner (Azerbaijan) grew bolder. President Aliyev now knows Russia is unlikely to ever intervene against Azerbaijan unless something dramatic changes. Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan are now seen as temporary guests. In fact, Aliyev has hinted that if any extension of their stay is to happen beyond 2025, it would only be with Azerbaijan’s approval – implying he might want them gone. This is a sensitive matter: if Russia’s troops leave, Moscow loses its last direct influence lever in Azerbaijan. If they stay without Baku’s consent, it could spark a serious confrontation. Thus, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s resolution removed a long-standing reason for Baku to tolerate Moscow’s presence. With Karabakh “resolved” (from Azerbaijan’s perspective), Baku feels it can firmly tell Russia it is not needed as a referee anymore.

In short, the 2020 war and its aftermath significantly shifted the power balance. Azerbaijan emerged stronger and more confident, while Russia’s image as the region’s security guarantor took a blow. This has set the stage for the current tensions – Azerbaijan feels it can stand up to Russia, and Russia is grappling with the reality that its influence in the Caucasus is slipping away.

Recent Flashpoints and Mysteries

Finally, several recent incidents have spiked tensions and are worth noting. These events might not all be front-page news worldwide, but in Azerbaijan and Russia they caused a stir and added to mutual suspicion.

The Plane Crash Cover-Up (2024): On December 25, 2024, an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane (Flight J2-8243) crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, during an emergency landing. There were 67 people on board; 38 sadly died apnews.com. What turned this tragedy into a diplomatic lightning rod was the cause of the crash. The plane was originally flying from Baku to Chechnya (a region in Russia). President Aliyev revealed startling information: the plane had come under electronic jamming and was accidentally shot at by Russian air defenses reuters.com. Basically, Russian forces trying to repel a Ukrainian drone attack mistakenly hit the civilian plane. Aliyev said some people in Russia then lied about the cause, offering “absurd” explanations like a bird strike or gas cylinder blast reuters.com. “We witnessed clear attempts to cover up the matter,” Aliyev stated bluntly on TV reuters.com. Putin gave a rare apology, calling it a “tragic incident,” but never formally admitted responsibility apnews.com. Azerbaijan’s public was outraged that their civilians became victims of Russia’s war-related shooting. Baku demanded Russia punish those responsible reuters.com. The fact that Russian officials were not transparent at first really hurt trust. This plane crash incident remains a sore point – a symbol, for Azerbaijanis, that Russian activities (in this case, defending against drones) can spill over and kill their people, and then be swept under the rug. It’s a less-publicized event internationally but hugely significant in Azerbaijan.
Deaths of Azeris in Russia (2025): In June 2025, as mentioned earlier, Russian police in Yekaterinburg conducted raids tied to decades-old murder cases. In the process, two Azerbaijanis – brothers in their 50s – died in custody washingtonpost.comwashingtonpost.com. Autopsies in Azerbaijan showed they had broken ribs, internal injuries, and had likely been beaten to death washingtonpost.com. Baku was incensed. It accused Russian law enforcement of acting with ethnic bias and brutality. Azerbaijan’s government called it “demonstrative targeted…extrajudicial killing” of its citizens apnews.com. They canceled cultural events with Russia and even withdrew from some diplomatic meetings in protest washingtonpost.com. This incident might seem local, but it had international repercussions. It suggested to Azerbaijan that Azerbaijanis aren’t safe or respected in Russia. Whether the men were guilty of crimes or not, the manner of their deaths and the lack of clear Russian accountability infuriated the public and officials in Azerbaijan. In return, as we saw, Azerbaijan took actions against Russian entities in Baku. The cycle of retaliation fed a serious crisis.
Information Leaks and Diplomatic Spats: Over the years, there have been various leaks and rumors adding spice to the tensions. For example, U.S. diplomatic cables (revealed by WikiLeaks in 2010) showed candid remarks by Azerbaijani leaders about Russia, which likely annoyed the Kremlin. In one cable, President Aliyev reportedly compared dealing with Iran’s leaders to “dealing with a crazy person” and noted Russia’s own troublesome behavior – comments not meant for public consumption. While these were not headline news for most people, they confirmed Russia’s belief that Aliyev was not a loyal friend behind closed doors. On the Russian side, media leaks have sometimes suggested Azerbaijan is helping Western or Israeli intelligence (for instance, rumors that Azerbaijan allowed Israel to use its airfields to spy on Iran). Both countries have also had to expel supposed spies from time to time. Each leak or spy scandal, even if small, chips away at trust.
Plane Shoot-downs and Apologies: It’s worth noting that incidents involving aircraft have happened before, though long ago. In 1988, during Soviet times, the USSR shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane by mistake. More recently, during the 2020 war, Azerbaijan accidentally shot down a Russian military helicopter, killing two Russian pilots (this happened on Armenian territory). Azerbaijan immediately apologized for that, and Russia surprisingly brushed it aside, likely to keep relations smooth meduza.io. However, the 2024 plane crash over Russia brought back memories of such incidents. It all reinforces how delicate things can become when lethal mistakes occur.

Each of these flashpoints – the Aktau plane crash, the Yekaterinburg deaths, the tit-for-tat arrests, and various leaked revelations – has added layers of resentment. They might seem like isolated events, but together they paint a picture of a relationship that is deteriorating on multiple fronts.

Conclusion

In summary, the rising tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan from 2009 to the present are driven by a mix of historical grievances and new strategic realities. Russia’s influence in the Caucasus has been fading, while Azerbaijan has been charting an independent course with new allies like Turkey (and even Israel). Economic interests such as pipeline routes and gas exports give Azerbaijan confidence and reduce Moscow’s sway. Military cooperation and alliances have shifted, with Baku relying less on Russian arms and more on partners that make the Kremlin uneasy. Behind the scenes, espionage and proxy battles have further eroded trust. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was a turning point that emboldened Azerbaijan and sidelined Russia’s role as a regional policeman. And recent unexplained incidents – from a downed plane to deaths in police raids – have inflamed public anger on both sides.

What used to be a quiet partnership has become a cautious rivalry. Both countries still maintain diplomatic courtesies, but beneath the surface there are many wounds. As Russia grapples with bigger conflicts elsewhere, Azerbaijan is seizing the moment to assert itself. This deep dive into the less-publicized motivations shows that the tensions are not just about one or two events – they are the result of years of shifting power, broken trust, and diverging paths. Keeping peace and balance between Moscow and Baku will likely remain a challenge in the coming years, especially as old agreements expire and new realities set in.

Here are some visuals related to the Russia–Azerbaijan tensions:

Map of the Zangezur Corridor – showing the strategic route connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia, a key element in regional power dynamics reuters.com+15middleeasteye.net+15youtube.com+15.
Nagorno‑Karabakh region map – illustrating areas of control after the 2020 war and showing where Russian peacekeepers remain reuters.com.
Civilians evacuated by Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh (2023) – reflecting the active role and limitations of Russia’s presence in the conflict youtube.com+8reuters.com+8apnews.com+8.